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PREFATORY REMARKS 
I was employed as a Ph.D. Fellow at my department in April 2006 and this 
paper is an excerpt from the first of the two problematiques that my 
monographic dissertation will analyze. It is written under the guidance of 
Professor Poul Erik Mouritzen. I have as of now only made preliminary 
empirical investigations into the subject matter and the paper therefore 
exclusively deals with theoretical issues. 
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ABSTRACT 
The paper outlines a theoretical framework for understanding reform-
related opportunism in connection with current local government mergers 
in Denmark. The chain of reasoning is based on a local government version 
of the political business cycle. Where this model predicts cyclical financial 
patterns on reversible financial expenditures within each election period, 
the developed argument on local government mergers posits a pattern on 
non-reversible expenditures in the immediate years preceding them. The 
paper utilizes a theory-testing design with explanatory factors on two levels 
(individual and group level). This is achieved with the aid of insights from 
collective action theory. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
To use an old quote from Wildavsky, budgeting is the life blood of 
government and in his words the budget provides us with the annals of the 
great battle for the societal pie; or in Lasswell’s classical terms: the 
political struggle for who gets what, when and how. However, talk of the 
budget in singular seems ill guided at best, both generally and particularly 
in the case under investigation here, Denmark, where local authorities 
account for the torso, arms as well as the legs of the welfare state, 
figuratively speaking. As things would have it, Denmark is presently 
engaged in a complete remapping of her communal landscape, the second 
of its kind in the span of four decades; and like its predecessor reform 
(which came into effect on 1st April 1970), it also has local government 
mergers at its centre. In numerical terms, 236 of the 270 existing 
municipalities are currently merging into 64 new authorities, leaving 34 
unaffected and giving a total of 98 new ones per 1st January 2007. 
Furthermore, the 14 current counties are merging into 5 new regional 
authorities within the same period of time. 
Heading for the dustbin of has-beens can lead to decidedly 
myopic and short-sighted behavior in spite of its longer-term and societal 
consequences. Conversely, those whose existence remains unchallenged 
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should not experience such a displacement between current and future 
interests as they will see the morning sun for the many days to come. This 
is an almost paradigmatic theme especially within the game-theoretical 
literature, where it typically is discussed in the form of one-shot and 
endgame situations or discounting inter alia modeled as backwards 
‘unzipping effects’ when continued interaction is abruptly halted. Since the 
reasoning behind the argument is explicated later, let us here suffice to say 
that there are strong theoretical reasons for expecting actors’ time horizons 
to have a strong influence on their behavior1. On this background, I forward 
the following for theoretical deliberation and empirical investigation: 
Have the municipalities’ and counties’ taken to any financially 
opportunistic behavior in the years preceding the second local 
government reform? 
There is both a descriptive and an explanatory dimension in the question 
and this paper stresses the latter in the form of a theory-testing design. The 
temporal delimitation of the problematique is the fiscal period from 2003 to 
and counting 2006. For this is the timeframe in which it makes sense to 
expect reform speculation on the part of local government: as depicted in 
Figure 1 below, talk of reform was first sparked by the Prime Minister in 
his 2002 opening speech to Parliament on 1st October. At the same time, a 
Commission on Administrative Structure was appointed to assess whether 
the existing municipal and county structure was in need of an overhaul. 
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Figure 1: Timeline on the Second Local Government Reform 
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Then on 9th January 2004 the Commission publicized its findings which 
subsequently were used (rather selectively) as the basis for an agreement on 
a local government reform on 24th June.  The agreement stipulated that the 
municipalities should merge under the condition that the demographic base 
of the new authority be at least 20.000 inhabitants (approx.); and further 
that the deadline for voluntary mergers was on 1st January 2005 (Indenrigs- 
og Sundhedsministeriet 2006a; Regeringen 2004)2. This gave the local 
authorities a window of opportunity for merging of roughly two years from 
the first talk of reforms, and of about six months from when the actual 
agreement was reached. 
The incumbent government has been all too aware of incentives 
for local reform speculation, and has therefore instigated various 
countermeasures parallel to the aforementioned agreement so as to 
circumscribe any local financial wholesale; and the first measure was 
already put in place in December 2003 before the Commission published 
its findings. Among these countermeasures was also the institutional advent 
of temporary (municipal) integration and (county) preparation committees 
for the fiscal year of 2006: these were composed of the new authorities’ 
politicians (as elected the November 2005 local elections); and for 
competences they were granted wide financial powers of approval over 
their respective merging town or county councils in 2006, whose tenure 
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was extended for a year after the 2005 elections. As explicated later, their 
advent arguably introduces an element of temporary bicameralism into the 
traditionally unicameral (read: sovereign) town and county councils; and 
the committees thus take on the role of powerful de jure second chambers. 
Nothing has so far been said on what constitutes financially 
opportunistic behavior. Its actual operationalization will be dealt with later 
but it is obviously reform-related financial dispositions (read: speculation) 
of some sort. This begs the question of what ‘business as usual’ is supposed 
to be, as such non-reform-related behavior constitutes our base of 
comparison. 
2 WHERE YOU STAND, DEPENDS ON WHERE YOU SIT 
We expect politics to make a difference. However, we should not just look 
for differences along partisan lines as any decentralized system of 
government presupposes the marriage of two very difference logics: that of 
centrally held macroeconomic responsibility with (some degree of) local 
autonomy. As the caption cites Allison for having said (Allison and 
Zelikow 1999), it is reasonable to expect that actor behavior is shaped by 
where they sit: in this case behind a desk on Capitol Hill or in a town or 
county councils farther from the pinnacles of central power. If local 
authorities merely were a provincial extension of central government (as 
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arguably is the case in, say, France), then it would be meaningful to 
characterize the central-local relationship as a delegation (principal-agent) 
problem. However, the Danish case is rather a situation of strategic 
interaction between different but interdependent levels of government. On 
the one hand, the Danish local authorities enjoy autonomy from Capitol 
Hill; indeed it is constitutionally secured albeit this only pertains to their de 
jure existence3. On the other hand, their autonomy is less than absolute, as 
its scope being is dictated by the central powers. As Christensen et al notes 
on the matter: 
“The municipalities [and counties] are a part of the public 
administration and as such subordinate to Parliament. At the 
same time, the town [and county] councils are elected and 
therefore accountable to the local voters”, 
(freely translated from Christensen, Christiansen, and Ibsen 
1999). 
So although part of the same public administration, the interests of central 
and local government are not the same. However, the functioning of each is 
necessary for the other and they exist in a relationship as complementary 
opposites: the local authorities accounting for the torso, arms and legs of 
the welfare state, and the central powers as its guiding head. This touches 
on the issue of voter accountability which likewise differs between the 
levels of government; as noted by the Danish Economic Council: 
“The Government will by the voters be held responsible for the 
overall economic development while the local politicians 
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normally are judged by other criteria, for example communal 
taxes or the service level”, 
(freely translated from Økonomiske Råd 2002). 
This means that each level caters to different interests in different 
electorates, the local authorities’ voter population being a subset of the 
Government’s. Their performance is thus also assessed differently by Mr. 
and Mrs. John Q Taxpayer. Take the case of the local authorities: on the 
face of it, their expenditure levels on, say, child-care or road maintenance 
are, like many decisions, the end result of a vast number of decisions made 
within numerous areas by potentially just as many people (Pallesen 2003); 
in this sense, the life of local government seems quite similar to that of 
central government. However, the local authorities cater exclusively to the 
interests of their local electorates. As one scholar has noted: 
”What counts for the individual town [or county] council is not 
the economy in general. It is particularly considerations for the 
municipality [or county] and its economy. If you can get away 
with not paying then you do so gladly”, 
(freely translated from Andersen 2000b). 
One can even make the argument that local authorities are legally required 
only to take the interests of their local electorate into account – at least 
when no legal provisions exist stating otherwise; for as Andersen notes: 
”Whether the municipalities [or counties] can act without legal 
authority depends on the purpose of the task. The service must [, 
however,] exclusively benefit the local community”, 
(freely translated from Andersen 2000a; cursive omitted). 
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Now take the viewpoint of central government. It will be held accountable 
for national issues such as overall public finances, which it can ill afford to 
be complacent about. For example, increases in local service provisions 
might be well received in the affected communities; but the government 
will quickly find its public support dwindling if those increases erode 
national goals for public expenditure levels, in which it has invested 
resources and prestige. In this way, a decentralized system of government 
presupposes the marriage of two very different logics at odds with each 
other: that of centrally held macroeconomic responsibility and (some 
degree of) local autonomy in the predominantly local service production 
and provision of the Danish welfare state4. From this perspective, 
adherence to national issues cannot be expected to arise automatically out 
of local self-interest. So Adam Smith’s invisible hand of auto-piloting self-
interest might be a sufficient depiction of the functioning of markets (under 
certain conditions, of course); but a completely different, political logic is 
at work here – one that is premised on where you sit and thus in turn who 
you have to answer to. 
The chain of reasoning has until now been worded in terms of 
‘authorities’. But it is people who make decisions and not faceless entities, 
in our case elected politicians at central and local levels of government. 
The literature on the motivational factors of politicians is quite extensive, 
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and it is not for me to review it here. However, two salient factors in the 
debates have been re-election (opportunism) and partisan (ideological) 
affiliation. The heretofore reasoning assumes politicians to be 
opportunistically motivated with their position on the levels of government 
prescribing what s/he is held accountable for and by whom; in this way, the 
politicians’ level of government determines whom the s/he owes his or hers 
allegiance to if seeking to be re-elected. 
3 A THEORY ON BUSINESS AS USUAL: THE POLITICAL 
CYCLE 
So how does one go about getting re-elected locally and just what is ‘usual’ 
opportunistic behavior? As for the former question, there are legion 
different ways to sway the voters’ opinion in one’s favor, at least 
potentially. However, I delimit my attention to manipulating the temporal 
distribution of the costs and benefits of local government policies over the 
election period: i.e. local political (business) cycles5. This is assumed to be 
the means for securing the politicians’ goal of re-election. But how great is 
the financial autonomy of the town and county councils in making financial 
displacements within the election period? They obviously do not have the 
same policy instruments at their disposal as central government; indeed that 
is intentionally so inter alia to maintain centrally held macroeconomic 
responsibility. However, on the expenditure side they do have authority 
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over local expenditures (read: service provision), at least to the extent that 
centrally imposed legal provisions do not mandate otherwise. The town and 
county councils’ autonomy also extends to the income side, where they 
inter alia have the right to set their own level of taxation, although also this 
has been subjected to centrally imposed restrictions over time (Mouritzen 
1989). The local politicians thus have at least some room for manoeuvre in 
altering tax and expenditure levels within the election periods to their own 
gain6. 
As for the latter question, opportunistic behavior on the part of 
local politicians pertains to the timing of the policy changes on tax and 
expenditure levels as the means for the aim of political re-election. But this 
does not necessarily say anything about the prudence of the policy changes 
themselves, financially or otherwise7. However, it might be related to some 
types of expenditures and policy areas as discussed later. 
In Denmark, local politicians are elected for a four-year fixed-
term period and as seen in Figure 2 below, the local political cycle leads us 
to expect contractive financial policy changes in the beginning of the 
election period in the form of (electorally unpopular) tax hikes, the fully 
drawn curves, or cuts in expenditure levels (read: service provision), the 
dashed curves. Conversely, we should see expansive policy changes in the 
end of the election period in the form of tax cuts and increases in local 
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expenditures (service provision)8. The intersection between these two 
periods and their differing financial expectations (the dotted vertical lines) 
reveals the central assumption behind the model’s chain of reasoning: that 
voter memory is assumed to be relatively short and restricted to the end of 
each election period9. 
 
Figure 2: The local political cycle 
Every year is thereby an election year in the local political cycle, in the 
sense that behavior in interim years serves a purpose in regard to the 
election years: either you are saving up or you are spending to bolster 
public support10. However, this does not mean that the politicians’ time 
horizon can be restricted to any given election period in itself. They still 
have to look beyond the current period, for as Easton noted long ago: 
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“If the authorities sought to meet all grievances over past outputs 
greater discomfort might well be in store for the members. The 
authorities would thereby be creating future conditions militating 
against the growth of specific support. This is just one way of 
formulating the short-run instead of the long-run problem that 
must constantly plague all political authorities. Response to 
demands for increases in expenditures in any area… must all be 
balanced against probable wants, demands and grievances of 
members in the future. The authorities cannot discount the future 
entirely; to do so would at least expose them to the possibility of 
future incapacity to meet demands”, 
(Easton quoted in Mouritzen 1991; cursive added). 
So you restrict spending to ensure something along the lines of long-term 
cost neutrality over the election period or periods (; otherwise you would 
be re-elected to a bankrupt authority that with all probability would be put 
under central administration.) This can be visualized in Figure 2 by 
drawing an imaginary line through the curves’ point of intersection in each 
election year: savings from the beginning of the election period amount to 
spending at its end (at least approximately)11. 
Maintaining a long-term capacity to meet voter demands also 
presupposes reversibility or non-permanence in the policy changes, which 
means that we can relate our expectations to expenditure type: we should 
expect the policy changes to occur on expenditures for operations which 
can be renegotiated yearly during the adoption of the local budgets (Juul 
and Kyvsgaard 2004). However, this is also necessary in the short term so 
as to be able to shift from contractive to expansive policy changes over the 
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election period. Conversely, expenditures on construction are non-
reversible and also carry derived expenditures on inter alia operations and 
maintenance which are likewise hard to reverse. Furthermore, we can 
differentiate between the political salience of different policy areas, as the 
reasoning in the local political cycle is premised on political re-election: 
policy changes should thus be expected in high profile policy areas such as 
child care and not in low-key areas such as road maintenance which are 
less visible and tangible by the voter population. This means that we can 
make the models’ expectations narrower that what was formulated initially, 
at least regarding the expenditure side.  
The recurring importance of political re-election as explicated 
above is the ever-present context (read: base of comparison) that my 
problematique should be understood in relation to; and the relevant 
timeframe to consider is from the 2001 local elections preceding the second 
local government reform to the first elections after the reform in 2009. The 
crucial question is how the ‘external shock’ of the local government reform 
has affected the local governments’ behavior in the pre-reform years (from 
2003 to and counting 2006) relative to what we would expect from the 
local political cycle12. 
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4 A THEORY ON THE ECONOMICS OF GOING OUT OF 
BUSINESS 
Having now explicated ‘usual’ opportunistic behaviour, how are we to 
define the ‘unusual’ reform-related opportunism? It has to be understood in 
relation to the central-local relationship and local political cycle explicated 
above. As for the latter, the cycle is an expression of ‘business as usual’ 
and as such unrelated to the local government mergers. However, the local 
governments’ financial behaviour in the years preceding the reform has to 
be understood relative to the logic of the cycle. In other words, the goal of 
political re-election (to which local policy changes is the means) cannot 
merely be understood as a function of the amount of time until the next 
election year. Re-election thereby also comes to depend on the effects of 
the mergers, which alters the very rules of the game for the politicians. It 
actually becomes a different game with new players (read: political 
opponents) in a brand new and larger ballpark (read: electorate). So if the 
argument is that politicians seeking to be re-elected should adhere to the 
local political cycle under ordinary circumstances, then what does it take to 
get re-elected when facing a merger in the near-future? 
 To start us off, let us situate the issue at hand within the central-
local relationship: as the argument from Chapter 2 goes, it makes a 
fundamental difference whether you sit behind a desk on Capitol Hill or in 
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one of the town or county councils, the reason being that each has to cater 
for different concerns and interests in different electorates; and so their 
respective perspectives on what opportunism constitutes will likewise 
differ. As Blom-Hansen notes in relation to the current reform and 
incentives for local financial wholesale before “closing time”: 
”…no local politician apparently wishes to enter into a regional 
[read: merged] municipality with a full coffer. The money has 
also been collected from the municipality’s inhabitants and 
should therefore be used for their benefit”, 
(freely translated from Blom-Hansen 2005). 
From the perspective of local government, opportunistic behaviour can thus 
be seen as nothing short of local acts of patriotism purely on moral 
grounds. However, it can likewise be understood as pertaining to political 
re-election as prescribed in the local political cycle in the previous chapter 
(see Figure 2 on page 13), as do I. At any rate, central government can be 
expected to have quite a different take on the matter, as they cater to 
different concerns in the national electorate: the local councils may (and 
arguably should) be quite indifferent about the country’s financial state of 
affairs, for which they are not held accountable13. However, central 
government will and can thus ill afford to stand idly by while local 
authorities engage in financial wholesale. In this way, defining 
opportunistic financial behaviour as opportunistic in the first place lends 
itself to the central government’s view on the matter (; and perhaps this 
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view is also shared by a subset of the local politicians, as will be explicated 
in Chapter 4.4.) In the words of the Ministry of the Interior and Health, 
opportunistic behaviour amounts to 
”...arrangements made by the existing municipalities and 
counties that directly or indirectly can affect the possible 
arrangements of future municipalities and regions, and where 
these arrangements would not have been made or would have 
had a different content, provided the new units had had power of 
authority”, 
(freely translated from Indenrigs- og Sundhedsministeriet 2006c). 
This phrasing pertains to the fiscal year 2006 where the integration and 
preparation committees were in operation. However, it is of little use as a 
definition of opportunistic behavior which it defines counterfactually 
relative to what the new (2005 elect) town and county councils would have 
done if put in their place. Instead, opportunism in relation to the reform 
should be defined relative to the ordinarily expected opportunism of the 
local political cycle. But how are we to separate ordinary and reform-
related opportunism? Politicians acting opportunistically under normal 
(non-reform) circumstances take the long-term capacity to meet voter 
demands into consideration, this by ensuring reversibility in their financial 
behavior over the election period (cf. page 14). However, politicians taking 
to opportunism when facing local government mergers should conversely 
seek non-reversibility in their financial dispositions. The reason is that the 
electorate of local politicians in merging authorities is expanded to 
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encompass all the merging units. However, who says that their electoral 
base is similarly expanded and evenly distributed in the new electorate? On 
the contrary, the local politicians arguably do best by assuming that their 
power base (read: electoral support) remains concentrated within the 
boundaries of their old authority, at least in the short term14. And so local 
politicians in merging authorities can be expected to engage in what is 
traditionally dubbed ‘parish politics’ by providing their local areas with 
preferential treatment at the detriment of longer-term and societal 
considerations. The advantage of non-reversibility it that such financial 
dispositions cannot be overturned in the merged authority’s future yearly 
budgetary negotiations. So you actively engage in creating sunk costs in 
your local electorate to win their favor, costs only reversible at great 
expense to the new, merged authority. Such parochial sentiments have even 
(unintentionally) been aided by statutory provisions for the 2005 local 
elections which stipulate that the politicians’ local origin may be stated on 
the ballot paper (Indenrigs- og Sundhedsministeriet 2005; Indenrigs- og 
Sundhedsministeriet 2006b). 
4.1 THE EFFECTS OF MERGING  
The imminent demise of the great majority of municipalities and counties 
means that the shadow of the future in the merging units becomes a 
decidedly sunny affair. In other words, the discount factors of the merging 
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authorities become markedly lower than those of the non-merging ones. 
The model presented in the following is a simple bivariat, unidirectional 
and positive causality as illustrated in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: Reform-related opportunism and merging 
Merging is defined dichotomously as Mi = {0; 1} = {no, yes} and the 
heretofore chain of reasoning leads us to expect that merging authorities 
have increased their non-reversible expenditures, Ni, more than the non-
merging units15. These policy changes are calculated relative to when the 
authorities became aware that mergers were underway; and as elaborated in 
Chapter 1, that point in time was between 1st October 2002 where talk of 
reform was initiated and 24th June 2004 where the deadline for voluntary 
mergers became known. However, regardless of the specific date the policy 
changes are calculated as: 
 i, t 847, 2003i, t 847, 2003
i, t 1 847, 2002
N N
N ,   e.g  N
N N÷
Δ = Δ = , (4.1) 
where i denotes the local authorities’ numerical designation. Furthermore, t 
and t ÷ 1 respectively denote (not necessarily consecutive) points in time 
after (t) and prior to the mergers became known (t ÷ 1). The example above 
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shows just one possible operationalization and what fits best is a matter of 
empirical investigation. 
 It is important at this point to comment on the definition of 
reform-related opportunism as non-reversible expenditures: such 
expenditures are of course used on an ordinary basis as an essential part of 
local government. Examples would include the construction of a new 
school, a road extension or a home for the elderly. This can be financed in a 
host of ways such as increasing taxes, borrowing, using accumulated 
liquidity or a combination. So there are ordinary and reform-related non-
reversible expenditures. However, we can differentiate between the two 
types by looking at policy changes; at least if we assume that ordinary non-
reversible expenditures more or less are constant over time. This seems 
sensible inter alia because opportunistic policy changes can be expected to 
be of quite a large magnitude. 
 The heretofore chain of reasoning can be applied synchronously 
or diachronically, and the former leads us to expect that the merging 
authorities’ policy changes on non-reversible expenditures have been 
greater than in the non-merging units: 
 i, t 1, merging i, t 1, non mergingN N , and÷ ÷ −Δ = Δ  
 i, t , merging i, t , non mergingN N .−Δ > Δ   
(4.2)
(4.3)
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The equality firstly states that we expect no differences in the policy 
changes between the merging and non-merging units prior to when the 
mergers became known to the authorities. However the inequality states 
that we do expect a difference after, with the merging units’ policy changes 
exceeding those of the non-merging ones. It should be noted that these two 
statements are intimately related as the second is premised on the first 
holding up. Otherwise we cannot ascribe any explanatory power to the 
effect of the mergers as a factor on its own. 
 Secondly, we can apply the chain of reasoning diachronically 
by analyzing each merging authority’s policy changes on non-reversible 
expenditures before and after it learned that it was to be merged. 
Specifically, we would expect that 
 i, t , merging i, t 1, mergingN N .÷Δ > Δ  (4.4)
4.2 FROM POLITICIANS TO GROUP POLITICS 
Our expectations for variation in reform-related opportunism have so far 
solely been premised on whether the local authorities are merging with 
other units or not. However, we can introduce several further dimensions 
along which opportunism should vary among the merging units. In this 
chapter, the black box of local government is opened up by examining 
characteristics of these local polities which might have an impact on the 
interests in, and opportunity for, reform-related opportunism. 
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 The merging authorities have until now been treated as an 
exogenous and undifferentiated size. But they differ internally according to 
a host of factors including political ones, which are the focus of this 
chapter. Firstly, re-election has been the pivotal factor in the chain of 
reasoning developed so far. But what behavior are we to expect on the part 
of the not re-elected politicians? Can they be expected to remain passive or 
have they interests of their own that could be expected to circumscribe or 
exacerbate reform-related opportunism? One can here argue along several 
lines16 but the most sensible argument is, that if we expect re-elected 
politicians to resort to reform-related opportunism then non re-elected ones 
should do the opposite; otherwise re-election holds little in the way of 
explanatory value. This implies that if our model is correct, then we should 
expect the share of re-elected politicians in a given merging authority, Pi, to 
have an impact on reform-related opportunism in that unit: 
 
Figure 4: Reform-related opportunism and re-elected politicians 
The share can be formulated as a linear expectation calculated in percent as 
 ii
i
RP 100
T
= ⋅ , where 
 Ri is the number of re-elected councillors, and 
 Ti is the total number of councillors. 
(4.5) 
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However, majoritarian decision rules are commonplace in polities around 
the world and the Danish town and county councils are no exception, as 
they prescribe to simple majority. Therefore it seems more prudent to 
forward a nonlinear, ‘lumpy’ expectation: reform-related opportunism 
should be exacerbated in merging authorities where the re-elected 
politicians constitute a majority in the town or county council. This can be 
coded dichotomously by dividing Pi by 100 and rounding off to zero digits 
(; for example, a majority of 54 % in a council would be divided by 100 
yielding .54 and then rounded off to 1, and vice versa)17.  
A second potentially salient political factor in the merging 
authorities is whether a town or county council is dominated by a single 
party or stable coalition, compared to a more fragmented polity plagued by 
all the vices of minority government. As Mouritzen notes, this can be 
expected to make a difference in the local political cycle, as an absolute 
majority or majority coalition is less dependent on building public support 
compared to a minority (1991). However, can we expect reform-related 
opportunism to vary among the merging authorities relative to polity 
fragmentation? Yes we can to the extent that a fragmented council expects 
to be further weakened in the larger council for the merged authority. 
Conversely, a dominant party or coalition should be expected to be 
relatively less affected by the merger. Such a measure on polity 
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fragmentation can be operationalized as the concept of effective parties, 
EPi, borrowed from research on electoral systems (Elklit 2004). The 
measure is calculated as 
 i 2
x
1EP
p
= ∑ , where 
 px is the relative size of party x represented in 
 the council 
(4.6) 
By dividing 1 with the sum of each party’s squared relative size in 
authority, you get a measure for the effective number of parties, which 
should be interpreted in the following manner: 
”…[I]n a party system with two equally strong parties, the 
effective number of parties is exactly 2.0; for three equal parties 
it is 3.0; for two strong parties and one weaker party, it will be 
somewhere in the neighborhood of 2.5”, 
(Lijphart 1990)18. 
The expectation is therefore again a positive, univariat causality between 
fragmentation and reform-related opportunism: 
 
Figure 5: Reform-related opportunism and polity fragmentation 
So we expect the partition of a council into (effective) parties to affect 
reform-related opportunism. 
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4.3 RATIONAL MAN, IRRATIONAL SOCIETY: GROUP EFFECTS 
Expectations for variation in reform-related opportunism has until now 
been created among the old, pre-reform authorities (denoted by the 
subscript i), and sensibly so; for this is the analytical unit in the heretofore 
chain of reasoning. However, explaining opportunism is arguably premised 
on including an additional level of analysis; and this level is the new, 
merged authorities (denoted by the subscript j) cf. Figure 6 below. 
 
Figure 6: Levels of analysis 
N-level analyses have over the years risen in popularity within the social 
sciences, and is affiliated with the works of such scholars as Putnam (1988) 
and Moravcsik (1998) in the field of international politics. However, the 
model proposed here is based on collective action theory originating from 
Olson  (1971) and which since then has been extended by scores of 
scholars. The individual level is at the level of the 236 merging authorities 
whereas the group level is the 64 new, merged authorities. Of course, 
multi-level explanations require statistical techniques that allow for a 
hierarchical data structure, and the reader should keep this in mind when 
reading this chapter. 
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Applying the Olsonian framework on reform-related 
opportunism entails defining the local government mergers as a collective 
action problem. This has not been necessary until now as we only have 
worked with explanatory factors related to the individual authorities. 
However, the collective consequences of their individual actions become 
visible at the group level. Specifically, the merging authorities have 
collective action problems with regards to securing the new authorities a 
sound financial standing at their moment of (re-)birth on 1. January 2007. 
However, as elaborated earlier politicians seeking re-election have strong 
incentives to engaging in reform-related opportunism by increasing non-
reversible expenditures in their respective merging authorities. Adhering to 
individually rational behavior might thus lead to a collectively irrational 
outcome: the near or actual bankruptcy of the new authority that they are 
trying their best to get elected to. As the reader probably is aware of, this 
situation is the classical (N-person’s) Prisoners’ Dilemma as illustrated on 
the Pareto frontier below. 
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Figure 7: Prisoners’ Dilemma on the Pareto frontier 
The PD game is modeled with ordinal payoffs in the oft-used nomenclature 
of T for Temptation, P for Punishment, R for Reward and S for Sucker 
payoff (for example, see Axelrod 1984). The game is modeled with two 
players for the sake of exposition, and the preference ordering of each is T 
> R > P > S as marked out on each of the axes. The Nash equilibrium of the 
game is mutual defection resulting in the outcome (P, P) which is Pareto 
inferior to the outcome of mutual cooperation, (R, R) lying on the Pareto 
frontier. Actor 1 thus loses out by the amount of R ÷ P equaling a1 and 
actor 2 likewise with a loss of b1. The two remaining outcome, (T, S) and 
(S, T), are dealt with shortly in relation to the effect of group asymmetry. 
 Olson’s classical argument concerns the effect of group size: 
”…unless the number of individuals in a group is quite small, or 
unless there is coercion or some other special device to make 
individuals act in their common interest, rational self-interested 
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individuals will not act to achieve their common or group 
interests”, 
(Olson 1971; cursive original). 
So in the absence of coercion or ‘special devices’ we should expect the 
larger, merged authorities to have a collective action problem on their 
hands, this in the form of an abysmal financial standing. We define group 
size as the number of merging authorities in each new unit. This leads to an 
expectation of a positive causal connection between group size, GSi, j, and 
reform-related opportunism: 
 
Figure 8: Reform-related opportunism and group size 
Figure 9 shows the group size frequencies for the 236 merging 
municipalities (not counties which are omitted from visualization). As can 
be seen, the typical new, merged municipality is based on 3-4 authorities. 
But how large should a merger be in order to experience collective action 
problems? For instance, is a group of 3 merging municipalities ‘quite 
small’, in Olson’s words? It is hard to define a numerical boundary 
between small and large groups that is not arbitrarily chosen; and so it is 
left to a matter of empirical investigation whether reform-related 
opportunism varies along group size or not. 
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Figure 9: Group size frequencies (N = 236) 
 Group asymmetry is according to Olson a possible solution to 
collective action problems. One of the persisting conclusions from Olson’s 
work has been the counterintuitive ”…tendency for the “exploitation” of 
the great by the small” (Olson 1971). The argument is that collective action 
problems can be solved by somebody picking up the tab or providing a free 
lunch, if one will; that is, by distributing the costs of securing the collective 
good unevenly to the detriment of the group’s larger members19. This is 
done out of pure self-interest as the larger member has a larger stake in the 
collective good (; of course, this rests on the assumption that the good has a 
structure facilitating differently sized members to gain differently sized 
benefits from its provision. Otherwise group asymmetry should have no 
alleviating effect on collective action problems.) The asymmetry is 
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visualized in Figure 7 above where Actor 1 is the larger exploited member 
and Actor 2 the smaller free-rider. The resulting outcome (S, T) lies on the 
Pareto frontier and thus secures the collective good; but Actor 1 pays the 
price of R ÷ S equaling a2, while Actor 2’s free-riding results in an 
additional payoff of b2. We are therefore here faced with a matter of both 
(Pareto) efficiency and equity. 
So can some merging authorities look to other units in their 
group to hold back on reform-related opportunism? The answer seems to be 
yes: an asymmetrical factor with potential explanatory power is the size of 
the merging authorities’ electorates relative to that of their new, merged 
units. Although this factor’s unit of analysis is at the individual level, it is 
still a factor calculated from the group level. The argument is that size 
matters based on the importance of political re-election; and we would 
expect reform-related opportunism to vary according to the size of each 
merging authority’s electorate relative to the size of their new, merged 
electorate: 
 
Figure 10: Reform-related opportunism and relative electoral size 
Unlike the previous explanatory factors we here have a negative causality 
between electoral size and reform-related opportunism. This can be 
clarified with an example: the hypothetical merger of a large and small 
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authority would lead us to expect less opportunism in the former relative to 
in the latter. The reason is simply that the incentive for opportunism in the 
large authority would be much weaker than in the smaller, because it would 
dominate in the new, merged unit. It would therefore not think it necessary 
to increase its non-reversible expenditures prior to the merger, as it would 
be in a dominating, hegemonic position in the new authority. The measure 
is calculated (in percent) in the following manner: 
 i, ji, j
j
E
ES 100
ME
= ⋅ , where 
 Ei, j is the size of the authority i’s voter population, and 
 MEj is the size of the new, merged authority j’s voter 
 population. 
(4.7)
As also discussed earlier in relation to the measure on councilor re-election, 
this is a very linear understanding of the explanatory power of electoral 
size on reform-related opportunism. One can likewise here use more 
majoritarian measures, say, whether the authority’s voter population 
constitutes more than half of the new, merged electorate. However, I have 
yet to elaborate such measures and thus refrain from considering them here. 
However, there is another possible solution to collective action 
problems, namely that of institutional design (third-party, external 
enforcement) which is the subject of the next chapter. 
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4.4 COUNTERING LOCAL CARPE DIEM: COMMUNAL 
BICAMERALISM 
”The Constitution of 1953 abolished the [Danish] 
bicameral system… In Germany, the bicameral 
system’s double principle of representation is 
secured constitutionally. In Denmark, it was [de 
facto] reinstated with the local government reform 
in 1970”, 
(freely translated from Christensen 1998). 
Family additions are typically joyous occasions which, on the face of it, 
should make the local authorities ecstatic about the second local 
government reform; for they have been blessed with a bigger brother, albeit 
only temporarily for the fiscal year of 2006. But perhaps there is, in 
Shakespeare’s words, something rotten in the state of Denmark – or at least 
that might well be the local authorities’ take on the arrival of their new 
sibling. As this chapter will elaborate, the central powers at be have for 
2006 taken to the sport of heresthetics (Riker 1986) and tinkered not only 
with the scope of the authorities’ financial autonomy. No they have 
crawled into the black box of local government and altered the decision-
making system in the merging units.  
As Christensen as well as others have noted, Denmark might 
formally have abandoned bicameralism in 1953 but it was de facto 
reinstated following the local government reform in 1970 (see Blom-
Hansen 2002;and Christiansen 2000). This very much has to do with the 
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tendency for minority governments in Denmark that, given the lack of clear 
parliamentary majorities, have bolstered themselves by involving the local 
authorities’ organizations as a de facto first chamber20. The second local 
government reform has likewise introduced an additional bicameral system, 
now at municipal level and albeit only temporarily for the fiscal year of 
2006. This means that the merging authorities’ traditional ‘unicameralism’, 
the town and county councils’ local sovereignty, is circumscribed for 2006 
by ‘bigger brothers’ in the form of municipal integration and county 
preparation committees (and in some cases also by the Ministry of the 
Interior and Health, MIH)21. The former is thus reduced to a first chamber 
with the latter acting as powerful de jure second chambers. This 
‘strategizing in the large’ by the Government was laid down in the 
agreement on the local government reform: 
“In order to ensure proper preparation of the merger of 
municipalities, the district councils elected in the merged 
municipalities as a result of the local government election on 15 
November 2005 will act as integration committees in 2006”, 
(Indenrigs- og Sundhedsministeriet 2006a; cursive added). 
The bicameral system thus functions by pitting some of the municipalities 
up against the remaining ones, although the dividing line actually isn’t 
found between authorities but rather within each of them22. We are here 
touching on the pivotal issue of political re-election23. As noted in Chapter 
1 (on page 6), the committees are composed of the new authorities’ 
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politicians as elected the November 2005 local elections. The reason for 
introducing this temporary institutional superstructure is that it is in the 
fiscal year of 2006 that the municipal past stands face to face with its 
future, as it functions as a transitional year from the old to the new 
municipal division. As the Ministry of the Interior and Health notes on the 
competences of the bigger brothers: 
“By decisions to intervene in budgets etc. must be undertaken by 
weighing considerations for the existing municipality/county 
against considerations for the new unit and the general level of 
expenditures. The arrangements are established with the purpose 
of avoiding inexpediencies for the new units, but does not on the 
other hand entail a general transfer of decision-making authority 
and financial management to the integration and preparation 
committees etc.”, 
(freely translated from Indenrigs- og Sundhedsministeriet 2006c). 
The point is that because 2006 is the death bed for the old municipalities 
and year zero for the new ones, the interests of both has to be taken into 
account. In this way the Danish communal landscape has with a stroke 
been transformed into 64 bicameral systems at municipal level and 5 at 
county level, one for each group of merging authorities. Drawing on 
classical concepts from budgeting theory, we can say that re-elected 
politicians in 2006 take on the role of budgetary guardians against 
expenditures instead of acting as advocates for expenditures (for example, 
see Brunsson 1989). There is here a clear parallel to the expectations from 
the local political cycle, which expects contractive policy changes in the 
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immediate years after an election; and 2006 is the first year of the current 
local election period (as the tenure of the old town and county councils was 
extended for a year after the 2005 elections). 
 To be sure, the second chambers’ are fitted out with more than 
a rubber stamp, as they have been granted de jure veto right but no (direct) 
agenda-setting powers. So they might not be able to impose any decisions 
or expenditures of their own on the merging municipalities in their group, 
but they can severely circumscribe the municipalities’ decisions. A veto is 
by definition is reactionary, at least formally (for the moment leaving out 
possible preventive and anticipatory effects). This gives us the sequential 
time perspective in the two chambers’ decision-making powers, by which 
the first chamber’s decisions are known to the second chambers, but not 
vice versa. However, it the former can be expected to anticipate the 
behavior of the latter if we introduce a few sensible assumptions (qua the 
classical rollback argument). Stated in game-theoretical terms, the situation 
of a given merging authority i that is part of the new authority j can be 
modeled as an extensive form game with complete and perfect information 
cf. Game 1 below24. 
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Game 1: Structure of the Bicameral System 
The situation is modeled as a two-person game between each merging 
authority Ai, j, and its respective bigger brother, Cj or the MIH. The 
assumption of perfect information rests on the aforementioned sequential 
structure in the actors’ behavior. As for the assumption of complete 
information, it entails that each actor is assumed to know who the other 
actors are, their possible choices of strategy, and knowledge of their 
payoffs and thus also their preference orderings (Gates and Humes 1997). 
As for the authorities’ possible choices of strategy it is for now modeled as 
a dichotomous choice between resorting to reform-related opportunism or 
not. The committees likewise have a (more sensibly modeled) dichotomous 
choice between approving or rejecting the decisions of the aforementioned, 
owing itself de jure veto right and lack of agenda-setting powers. 
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 So how does this institutional context alter our expectations to 
the authorities’ financial behavior in the years preceding the mergers? I 
have yet to develop the implications of this institutional change in game-
theoretical terms. However the gist of the argument can be put in the 
following way: a classical argument on veto power is that its effect is seen 
in the very absence of its use. This leads us to expect that reform-related 
will not become a problem in the fiscal year of 2006 as it is blocked by the 
committees. In sum, opportunism is expected to be rampant in the years 
2003 to and counting 2005 but not in 2006.  
This institutional variation within the years preceding the 
reform furthermore opens up for testing a hypothesis related to the 
covertness in the opportunistic financial dispositions: if the merging 
authorities want to try to get away with reform-related opportunism in 2006 
then they would have to engage in creative bookkeeping inter alia by re-
posting expenditures between accounts. The budgetary system for Danish 
local government has some loopholes that the authorities might attempt to 
utilize: most important is the vague distinction between expenditures on 
operations (reversible) and constructions (non-reversible) which is less than 
clear (Juul and Kyvsgaard 2004); for example, replacing the tarmac on an 
existing road can equally be designated as an expenditure pertaining to 
construction or wear and tear and thus operations. I have yet to formalize 
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the argument but covertness can be operationalized by creating measures 
for transfers between selected financial accounts. Increased transfer activity 
between accounts in 2006, defined relative to the remaining years leading 
up to the reform, would be evidence of such creative bookkeeping. 
4.5 CLOSING REMARKS 
This concludes the outline of the theoretical framework that will be used to 
analyze the Danish local authorities’ financial behavior in the years leading 
up to the second local government reform. I have not commented on the 
mutual relationship between the various outlined factors. This will be  
matter for future elaboration. However, their explanatory power relative to 
each other is fundamentally a matter of empirical investigation. 
 It is worth noting that the base of comparison has shifted over 
the course of the paper: the expectations for variation in reform-related 
opportunism were initially modeled to vary between the merging and non-
merging authorities (Chapter 4.1). Then, the base shifted to variation 
synchronously among the merging authorities, or diachronically within 
each authority over time, premised on political characteristics in these local 
polities (Chapter 4.2). These individual level factors were subsequently 
complemented with group level factors among the merging units informed 
by collective action theory (Chapter 0). Finally, the step was taken from 
behavioral expectations to the impact of institutional change with the 
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conclusion that reform-related opportunism should occur prior to the fiscal 
year of 2006. This analytical pluralism has been sought actively by the 
author as it allows one to examine the same problematique from various 
angles. This arguably bolsters the validity and robustness of the empirical 
findings that will be undertaken at a later point in time. 
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Notes 
                                           
1 There are likewise strong empirical reasons which I will not delve into in this paper 
save for a brief note here: although the previous local government reform in 1970 
received little scholarly attention, there was also back then a considerable amount of 
uneasiness about opportunistic financial behaviour on the part of the local authorities in 
the years preceding the reform; and as one scholar notes, ”[b]y the first communal 
mergers there was not yet made sufficient financial safeguards in the conditions for the 
use of accumulated liquidity, which led to strange over-consumptions with the aim of 
securing that the money benefited the original population” (freely translated from 
Asmussen 2003). This presence of ‘strange overconsumptions’ in the last reform reveals 
a strong empirical relevance in relation to local financial behavior during the current 
reform. 
2 As it turned out, all but four municipalities made use of the voluntary solution though 
all the mergers obviously had a mandatory element in them regardless of whether they 
were ‘voluntary’ or forced (Indenrigs- og Sundhedsministeriet 2006a). 
3 Its content, the de facto scope that this autonomy affords the authorities, is however 
regulated centrally. 
4 Or welfare communes as they also have been called. 
5 Business in parentheses as it is a misleading term in the context of local government, 
the reason being the restricted policy instruments at the town and county councils’ 
disposal (Mouritzen 1991). 
6 However, they have little by way of influencing their local private sectors (Mouritzen 
1989). 
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7 This might not hold up if, say, tax cuts were financed via borrowing. However, it does 
seem sensible to restrict the understanding of opportunism strictly to the timing of the 
policy changes. Furthermore, the particular case of borrowing to finance tax cuts 
probably holds little explanatory value in the Danish case as the raising of loans by local 
governments is heavily restricted and earmarked for specific purposes. 
8 The actual slope of the curves is left to a matter of empirical investigation and so the 
sine-shaped curves of Figure 2 are merely used as a matter of exposition. 
9 The point of intersection need not lie at the temporal centre of the election period so 
the two periods need not be equally long. That they have been drawn as such in Figure 2 
is purely a matter of exposition. Also, the point of intersection can very well differ from 
one local authority to the next and is best left to empirical investigation. 
One problem in the figure is that it does not take a one-year time lag into 
account in the local governments policy changes. This is due to the fact that local 
government must, like all public authorities, adopt budgets in advance, to be precise on 
15 October each year at the latest. It is necessary to incorporate such a ‘reaction lag’ and 
this will be remedied at a later point in time. 
10 Given that the local political cycle here is modeled according to policy changes, it 
implicitly assumes that voters think in relative terms; that is, that they assess the 
politicians less according to long-term, absolute tax and service levels and more on 
short-term positive or negative changes in those levels. For example, this means 
assuming that a voter is less interested in whether s/he thinks that a municipality’s child 
care policy is adequately funded, and more interested in whether the policy area lately 
has received any additional funding. 
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11 The model thus assumes that local tax and expenditure levels remain constant over 
the long run across election periods. But this is empirically far from the case in 
Denmark as well as in a host of other polities. However, this issue is not important to 
the extent that one examines relative policy changes within each election period. 
12 External in the sense that the local government reform very much was a top-down 
project by central government. 
13 Central government could likewise argue along moral lines, say, that the marginal 
gain of each publicly spent dollar should not be lower because of the local government 
reform; that is, local government should not spend public means simply to keep the cash 
in the local area. Instead, it should consider all expenditures in the manner that it would 
have done if there had been no reform. 
14 It will not be considering whether voters realign over the long run and re-focus from 
their old local area to the new municipality’s boundaries, as this falls outside the 
problematique’s timeframe. 
15 Non-reversible expenditures will be operationalized inter alia with expenditures on 
construction and borrowing. However, I will also include financing sources such as 
consumption of accumulated liquidity and the sale of buildings. 
16 e.g. a moral obligation to see locally collected taxes spent for the benefit of the local 
(voter) population cf. the quote from Blom-Hansen on page 17. 
17 As it is required that number of councilors in a town or county council is odd between 
9 and 31, the re-elected politicians will by definition constitute a minority or a majority. 
 An alternative operationalization would be mayoral and not councilor re-
election, coded dichotomously as {0, 1} = {no, yes}. It might be appropriate here to 
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delve into why the mayoralty might have a significant impact on reform-related 
opportunism: generally speaking, mayors, often referred to as ‘city kings’ by the 
political punditry, hold a formidable position in Danish local politics for several 
reasons: most importantly, they are near-impossible to remove from office in between 
elections (Christensen and Espersen 1983) in all but the most exceptional circumstances 
cf. § 7, subsection 2, and § 66 of the Communal Administration Act. The problematic 
aspects of this near-political immunity became all too clear in the spring of 2002 with 
the case of one of the more controversial mayors in Denmark: Peter Brixtofte. Secondly, 
the mayor is often the only local politician employed full time which in several ways 
gives him or her advantages over the remaining town or county councillors. However, it 
will discard this operationalization here and instead include it as an alternative in the 
empirical investigations. 
18 It should be noted that EPi is a measure of legislative polity fragmentation in the 
sense that it is calculated on the basis of the parties represented in the town or county 
councils (i.e. the local party system). However, one could alternatively construct a 
measure on the locally governing incumbency denoting the size of the local mayoral 
coalition relative to council size. However, I will let this be a matter for future 
consideration. 
19 Or as Malnes puts it, free-rider incentives do not necessarily influence all group 
members with the same force (1983). 
20 The National Association of Municipalities and The Danish Regions. 
21 Notice that this temporary two-chamber system violates Montesquieu’s lessons on the 
division of power due to its overlapping membership. However, it is in line with the 
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Danish parliamentary tradition similar to the Westminster tradition of 
parliamentarianism, where members can hold seats in both the legislature and in the 
executive. 
22 Financial responsibility is thus decentralized to the merging authorities that are 
affected by it. We can therefore say that the new units are forces to internalize their own 
externalities created through reform-related opportunism within their respective 
merging groups. 
23 My argument here relies on the decision rule in the committees not being unanimity 
but some kind of majority rule, here simple majority which can be calculated in the 
basis of the number of seats divided by two + 1. However, what about the mayoralty’s 
power in the committee? Is it reneged to one mayor, one vote, as the committees inter 
alia hold no direct agenda-setting powers. 
24 No terminal nodes are included in the figure which therefore is not a game in the 
traditional sense. Instead, it merely visualizes the decision-making system in the 
merging authorities for 2006. 
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